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Macartney: An Unpaid Subcontractor Is Entitled to an Equitable Lien on the R

CASE NOTES'.
EQUITABLE LIEN-Miller Act Bond-An Unpaid Subcontractor
Is Entitled to an Equitable Lien on the Retainage
When There is no Bond
Kennedy Electric Co. v. United States Postal Service,
508 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974).
On December 30, 1969 the United States Post Office Department'
awarded a contract ,toJ. C. Corrigan Company for the construction of a mail
facility at Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Because the project was federally sponsored, Corregan was required to supply performance and payment bonds pursuant to the Miller Act. 2 Corrigan was unable to obtain the bonds and did
not notify the Department of its failure to file them. Corrigan Construction
Company, 3 defendant, subcontracted part of the contract to Kennedy Electric
Company, plaintiff, who furnished labor and materials that were incorporated
into the bulk mail handling facilities.
Both the contract and Department Regulations limited progress payments
to 70 percent of the costs incurred by the contractor up to a maximum of
1. The defendant-appellee is the United States Postal Service which, under the
Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), succeeded to the interests of the
former United States Post Office Department on July 1, 1971. The assets and liabilities
of the Post Office Department were transferred to the Postal Service and constituted its
initial capital. 39 U.S.C. § 2002 (1970).
2. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(e) (1970). The Miller Act required the Department to
obtain the bonds from Corrigan "before" awarding the contract. According to the contract, however, Corrigan had 10 days "after" the award within which to file the bonds.
The Miller Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States is
awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to the United States the following
bonds, which shall become binding upon the award of the contract to such person,
who is hereinafter designated as contractor:
(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer
awarding such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the protection of the United States.
(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such officer for the
protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in said contract for the use of each such person.
3. J.C. Corrigan Company had subcontracted a portion of the contract to Corrigan
Construction Company. Both J.C. Corrigan Company and Corrigan Construction Company were joined in the first suit as third party defendants. At trial, the Federal District Court for Colorado held that the two Corrigan companies were "for all practical
purposes a single entity." Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp.
828, 829 (D. Colo. 1973).
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70 percent of the contract price. 4 Nevertheless, the Department made progress payments to Corrigan far in excess of the stipulated amount.5 Despite
Corrigan's unsatisfactory progress under the contract and the repeated inquiries made by Kennedy into the status of the project, the Department failed
to investigate Corrigan's financial position as required under Department
Regulations.0
Not until April 1971, well over a year after awarding the contract, did the
Department discover Corrigan's failure to file the 'bonds. The following
month, upon determination that Corrigan's failure to file 'the bonds was willful, the Department terminated the contract. Corrigan thereafter declared
bankruptcy, and Corrigan Construction Co., the second company, became
insolvent. Both companies failed to pay Kennedy as a result of their financial
situations. Kennedy instituted suit against the United States Postal ServiceT
to recover the unpaid amount from the retainage it held.8 The Postal Service
asserted its own claims against the retainage which, if allowed, would have
exhausted the fund. 9 In rejecting the Postal Service's claims the Federal District Court for Colorado ruled that Kennedy held an equitable lien both on
funds which the Postal Service had retained and on funds that the Postal Service had wrongfully disbursed in a March 24, 1971 progress payment.' 0 The
Postal Service appealed. 'Held-Affirmed. When the protection provided
under the Miller Act to insure payment of a federal government subcontractor fails due to the noncompliance of either the prime contractor or the
government with the Act's requirements, such subcontractor is subrogated to
4. 41 C.F.R. § 1-30.510-1 (1971).
5. The Department made subsequent progress payments including the March 24,
1971 progress payment of $190,747.00 to Corrigan's assignee, First National Bank of
Boston which brought the total progress payments to $889,311.00. Even though the Department concluded the contract was 95 percent completed, this payment brought the
total progress payments made in excess of the 70 percent maximum allowable payments
to $225,072.78. Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 828, 83031 (D. Colo. 1973).
6. According to 41 C.F.R. § 1-30.521 (1971), the Department was required to obtain full information concerning both the progress payments under the contracts involved (including status of the subcontract) and concerning the contractor's other operations and financial condition. The Department violated the requirements of 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-30.521-1 (1971), providing "that particular care must be taken to assure that the
unpaid balance of the contract will be adequate to cover the anticipated cost of completion, or that the contractor has adequate resources to complete the contract .... "
7. The United States Postal Service succeeded to the interests of the United States
Post Office Department on July 1, 1971 under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1970).
8. The court in Kennedy refers to the funds retained by the Postal Service under
the contract including the March 24, 1971 progress payment as "retainage." Kennedy
Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 954, 958 (10th Cir. 1974).
9. See Brief for Appellee at 18, Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv.,
508 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974).
10. Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 828, 841 (D.
Colo. 1973), a/l'd, 508 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974).
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the equities of a surety and holds an equitable lien on -all funds retained, and
on those funds which should have been retained by the government."
A contractor engaged in public building or construction work is ordinarily
required to post a bond conditioned both on the faithful performance of the
contract as indemnification of the obligee government, and on the payment
of the claims of laborers, materialmen, and subcontractors in the prosecution
of the work. 12 In 1894 Congress enacted the Heard Act, which required
government contractors to execute penal bonds for the benefit of all persons
supplying labor and materials on the contract.' 3 Although the Miller Act repealed the Heard Act, it incorporated the Heard Act's basic provisions, and
was designed primarily to eliminate certain of the Act's procedural limitations 14 on the statutory beneficiaries in favor of facilitating an unpaid creditor's
realization of benefits under the payment bond." Current provisions of the
Miller Act require that before any contract in excess of $2,000 is awarded,
every government contractor is required to furnish to the United States a
performance bond for the protection of the government and a payment bond
to protect all persons supplying labor and material for the project.'6
The underlying purpose of the Miller Act is to afford laborers, materialmen
and subcontractors protection and security against irresponsible contractors
who fail to pay for the labor and materials incorporated into the construction project. 1 7 This protection is in lieu of traditional mechanic's liens estab11. Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 954, 960 (10th Cir.
1974).
12. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 302 U.S. 442, 443 (1938) (Heard
Act); Equitable Sur. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 448, 454 (1914) (D.C. statute modeled after Heard Act); Hardaway v. National Sur. Co., 211 U.S. 552, 5.54 (1909)
(Heard Act); Price v. H.L. Coble Constr. Co., 317 F.2d 312, 315, 321 (5th Cir. 1963)
(Alabama statute); Boka Elec. Constr. Co. v. W. M. Chappell, Inc., 262 F.2d 718, 720
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (D.C. statute).
13. Act of August 13, 1894, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (1894), as amended, Act of February 24, 1905, ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811.
14. Under the Heard Act, Act of February 24, 1905, ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811, a single
bond was required to protect both the government and the suppliers of labor and materials. The government was given the sole right to sue on the bond for 6 months after
completion of the work and final settlement. Other claimants were allowed to bring
suit only after the expiration of 6 months and had to join in a single action. Serious
inconveniences and delays resulted where claimants, often in need of immediate funds,
were compelled to settle meritorious claims for less than the full amount. Id. The Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1970), was designed to meet these difficulties by requiring
that the prime contractor execute two bonds-a performance bond to protect the government and a payment bond to protect the creditors. Id. Creditors can sue on the latter
bond without waiting for the government and even waiting for completion of the project.
Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 105-106 n.4 (1943).
15. Hearings on H.R. 2068 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935).
16. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1970). The amount of the performance bond is not specifically set by statute but is left to the judgment of the governmental officer letting the
contract. The amount of the payment bond, however, is defined in the Act depending
on the total contract price. Id.
17. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216 (1957); Equitable
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lished for laborers and materialmen of private building and construction contractors. I8 Such protection is necessary in view of the uniform rule of sovereign immunity exempting government property from liens. 19 The Miller Act
limits recovery on the payment bond to laborers, materialmen, and subcontractors who deal directly with the prime contractor, or who have a direct
20
contractual relationship with the subcontractor.
Recovery under the act is secured by a surety who guarantees the completion of the contract and the payment of the suppliers involved. The surety
on the bond of a public contractor becomes obligated to perform when a contractor has defaulted either in performance of the contract or in payment of
his subcontractors, according to the provisions of the suretyship. 21 Because
the surety has a contractual agreement with the prime contractor regarding
his obligations and compensation, he cannot be compelled to assume any liability not originally contemplated nor can the terms of the suretyship be altered without his consent. 22 If a surety's position has been prejudiced by
the contractor's or the obligee's actions, the surety may be released from any
23
liability.
Sur. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 448, 456 (1914); United States v. Ansonia Brass
& Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452, 471, 474 (1910); United States ex rel. Hill v. American
Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 107, 204 (1906).
18. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216 (1957); Illinois Sur.
Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917); United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 203 (1906); Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d
794, 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962).
19. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947); Equitable Sur.
Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 448, 455 (1914); Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Crane Co.,
219 U S. 24, 32 (1910); United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452,
471, 474 (1910); United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 203
(1906).
20. Although the Miller Act does not specifically define "subcontractor," it has been
considered in its technical sense as one "who performs for and takes from the prime
contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract,"
thus excluding ordinary laborers and materialmen. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United
States, 322 U.S. 102, 109 (1944). It would be impossible for the prime contractor to
protect himself if the class sought to be protected under the payment bond were not thus
defined. Id. at 110
21. See A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 1.4, at 3 (5th ed. 1951).
22. Wilkinson v. McKimmie, 229 U.S. 590, 593 (1913); Prairie State Bank v.
United States, 164 U.S. 227, 233-37 (1896); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 537 (1891);

Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13, 21 (1869); Miller v. Stewart, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 680, 702 (1824); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutin, 445 F.2d 1028,
1031 (5th Cir. 1971); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Gould, 258 F.2d 883, 887 (10th
Cir. 1958); United States v. Stephanidis, 46 F.2d 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); Bopst v.
Columbia Cas. Co., 37 F. Supp. 32, 34 (D. Md. 1940).
23. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 233-34 (1896). The surety
has been released from liability in several situations: where the government has made
premature or unauthorized payments; where the government has failed to withhold monies sufficient to meet the claims or liens of laborers and materialmen; and where the
government has failed to comply with the contractual stipulation for withholding a percentage of the contract price. id. at 233-34. It has been generally recognized that in
order for a surety to be discharged the action by the government must have resulted in
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Under the Miller Act a surety may present a claim against the fund which
the government retains until completion of the contract and acceptance of

the project. The surety predicates his claim on the equitable doctrine of sub-

rogation. 24 He must fulfill the contractor's obligation in a manner other than
as a mere volunteer, however, in order to be subrogated to the right of the
contractor in the unpaid contract amount.2 5 The surety, as assignee of the
obligee, may also bring an action at law against the principal-contractor. 26
As against the obligee, however, the surety's right is an equitable one. 27 The
courts have established the priority of the surety's equities to the retained
percentages of the contract price over an assignee of the contractor 28 and over
a trustee in bankruptcy when the surety had discharged his obligation prior
to the contractor's adjudication as bankrupt. 29 In certain situations, however,
the surety's rights have been subordinated to the government's claims against
31
the contractor3 0 and to the claims of laborers and materialmen.
substantial injury, loss, or prejudice to the surety. Pickens County v. National Sur. Co.,

13 F.2d 758, 762 (4th Cir. 1926).
24. Subrogation, as a matter of right, arises in favor of a surety who has paid the
debt which ought, in whole or in part to have been met by another. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534, 548-49 (1888); see Stickells, Bonds of Contractors on
Federal Public Works: The Miller Act, 36 B.U.L. REV. 499, 541 (1956).
25. United States v. National Sur. Co., 254 U.S. 73, 76 (1920); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534 (1888). In Aetna, the Supreme Court elaborated on the
prerequisites to asserting the equitable doctrine of subrogation stating,
1. that the person seeking its benefits must have paid a debt due to a third party
before he can be substituted to that party's rights; and, 2. that in doing this he
must not act as a mere volunteer, but on compulsion, to save himself from loss by
reason of a superior lien or claim on the part of the person to whom he pays the
debt, as in cases of sureties ....
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534, 547-49 (1888); A. STEARNS, THE LAW
OF SURETYSHIP, § 11.15, at 474 (5th ed. 1951); see II J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 6618, at 445-46, § 6601, at 425-26 (1944).
"The surety on the bond
of a prime contractor has been held entitled to all the equities of the principal and also
those of the creditor, under the doctrine of subrogation." Id. § 6601, at 425-26.
26. Generally the government is the obligee in the bonding situation-the prime
contractor is the principal. See A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 1.4, at 3 (5th
ed. 1951).
27. See II J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 6618, at 445-46 (1944).
28. Id. § -, at 561; Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 240 (1896);
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 121 F.2d 288, 292-93 (8th Cir.
1941); National Sur. Co. v. County Bd. of Education, 15 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1926);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 51 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
29. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 133, 141 (1962); Cox v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 247 F. 955, 957 (8th Cir. 1917).
30. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 239 (1947). In Munsey the
government was allowed a set-off against funds in its possession as damages arising out
of a debt incurred by the contractor under a separate and independent transaction despite the claims to the funds of the surety who had paid the laborers and materialmen.
The Supreme Court later in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962) emphasized that their decision in Munsey was only that the government could exercise the
well-established common law right of debtors to offset claims of their own against their
creditors. Id. at 140.
31. American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 137-38
(1935). In American Sur. Co. a surety on a Miller Act bond was not, by right of sub-
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The subcontractor who has contributed labor or materials has traditionally
been entitled to a lien in order to insure that he willnot go unpaid. 82 In
addition to the mechanic's lien, there is presently a morass of liens conferred
by state statutes to protect the various classes of producers and suppliers.33
A subcontractor may bring suit under the Miller Act on the payment bond
for the amount owed hin on the contract, provided that he give written notice
to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which he performed the
last of the labor or furnished the last of the material for which he is making
his claim.3 4 A government subcontractor's remedies are not defined, however, when there has been a failure to exact the required bonds.3 5

The concept that upaid laborers and materialmen possess an equitable lien
on the retainage of a government contract has emerged from a long line of
37
cases.3 6 The earliest of these cases, Greenville Savings Bank v. Lawrence,
rogation, entitled to'priority over the claims of laborers and materialmen who were bene ficiaries of the bond and who were not fully satisfied out of the bond upon the insolvency of the contractor with respect to the unpaid portion of the contract price retained
by the government. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 66 F.2d 730, 73637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 702 (1933). In Maryland Cas. Co. the surety who
completed the abandoned city contract was subrogated to the city's right to retain the
stipulated percentages and had priority .to them over laborers and materialmen, in the
absence of a contrary:contractual obligation. The payment bond is created for the security of laborers and materialmen and the. surety is not entitled to priority over those it
has contractually agreed to protect.
32. E.g., Smith v. Wilcox, 74 P. 708, 709 (Ore. 1903); Collins v. Board of Trustees
of Davis & Elkins College, 79 S.E. 10, 12, 14 (W. Va. 1913). For a discussion of the
history of liens see Note, Government Subcontractors'Remedies in Rem, 30 GEo. WASA.
L. REV. 994, 994-95 (1962).
33. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2204 (1967); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 26.281 (Supp.

1974); OaGON REV. STAT. § 87,085 (Supp. 1961).
34. 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1970).
35. There is a split in authority among state court decisions as to the liability to
laborers and materialmen of a public body and its officers who have failed to exact the
bonds required by state statutes similar to the Miller Act. The majority view holds that
when a contract for public work has been let without obtaining from the contractor the
statutory bonds conditioned on payment of claims for labor and material furnished to
the contractor, the public body is not liable to laborers and materialmen for work done
and material furnished in the absence of a statutory requirement that a public body either pay these claims or withhold funds to insure their payment. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Glenwood Springs, 19 F.2d 225,229 (8th Cir. 1927) (municipal corporation); Newt Olson Lumber Co. v. School Dist., 263 P. 723, 724 (Colo. 1928) (school
district); Woodward Lumber Co. v. Grantville, 79 S.E. 221, 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913)
(municipal corporation); J.E. Moss Iron Works v. Jackson County Court, 109 S.E. 343,
348 (W. Va. 1921) (county court). The minority view holds the public body liable
because it is through their negligence to exact the required bond that the laborers and
materialmen have lost the protection afforded by_ statute as a substitute for unavailable
lien rights on the property. Stephenson v. Monmouth Min. Mfg. Co., 84 F. 114, 117
(6th Cir. 1897); Warren ex rel. Hughes Supply Co. v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 66 So.
2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1953); C.A. Burton Mach. Co. v. Ruth, 186 S.W. 737, 737-38 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1916).
36. American Sur. Co..v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 138-39
(1935); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. McKinlay, 72 F.2d 89, 91 (D.C. App.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 583 (1934); Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio 'River Contract Co., 271.
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established the right of the governement to pay laborers and materialmen out
of the retained fund in preference to general creditors and assignees of the
contractor.8 8 Shortly thereafter in PrairieState Bank v. United States,3 9 the
Supreme Court expanded the equitable lien concept by recognizing that a
portion of the retained contract price was for the benefit not only of the
obligee, but also of the one who was guaranteeing the performance of the
work, thereby raising an equitable right in the surety. 40 The surety in
Prairie,who had completed construction of the Galveston Customs House
after the contractor's default, was subrogated to the rights of the United States
in the retainage and granted priority over a general creditor and an assignee
of the contractor. 41 Although Prairie did not involve laborers' and materialmen's claims, it demonstrates that parties other than the prime contractor or
the government might hold a claim to the retained funds.
In Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,42 a surety who
had paid the laborers and materialmen prevailed over an assignee in a suit
to recover funds held by the United States. 43 The Supreme Court based its
decision on the "respective equities of the parties," mentioning for the first
time the government's "equitable obligations to see that the laborers and
supply men were paid."'44 Subsequent cases have interpreted Henningsen to
hold that an equitable lien exists in favor of the surety who has discharged
the contractor's obligation to pay the suppliers, even though the decision did
45
not suggest that laborers and materialmen could hold such an equitable lien.
This lien came into existence while the retained percentages of the contract
price were still in the hands of the government 40 and it continued to exist
47
after distribution.
F. 144, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1921); Cox v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 247 F. 955,
957 (8th Cir. 1917); In re McGarry & Son, 240 F. 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1917); Greenville Say. Bank v. Lawrence, 76 F. 545, 548 (4th Cir. 1896).
37. 76 F. 545 (4th Cir. 1896).
38. Id. at 547.
39. 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
40. Id. at 233.
41. Id. at 232-33.
42. 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
43. Id. at 411.
44. Id. at 409-10.

45. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 F. 144, 148

(6th Cir. 1921); Cox v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 247 F. 955, 957 (8th Cir.
1917); In re McGarry & Son, 240 F. 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1917); In re Scofield Co., 215
F. 45, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1914).
46. In In re McGarry & Son, 240 F. 400 (7th Cir. 1917), the court found an equitable lien for the surety in funds which had already been paid over to the trustee in bankruptcy of the contractor, stating that "the $2,000 fund in the hands of the trustee stands
charged with the same equities . . .as when it was undistributed in the hands of the
United States." ld. at 402.
47. In Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 F. 144, 149
(6th Cir. 1921), the court described the lien as "an original and continuing equitable
priority in the fund,"
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The Supreme Court in United States v. Munsey Trust Co.,48 granted the
government a set-off against retained funds in its possession as damages arising out of a debt incurred by the contractor under a separate transaction.
Because the government was not only a stakeholder but was also asserting
a claim against the funds, Munsey is distinguishable from previous cases in
49
which the United States was a mere stakeholder.
During this period of interpretation of the Miller Act many courts began
to recognize the existence of an equitable lien of the unpaid laborers and
50
materialmen on the retainage held on a contract by the United States.
Such a lien was specifically recognized by the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri in United States ex rel. Reuter v. MacDonald
Construction Co.: 51

[A]n unpaid laborer or materialman has an equitable lien upon funds
in the hands of the United States which were retained from the prime
contractor .

. .

52
equitable lien.

. The passage of the Miller Act did not destroy this

In National Surety Corp. v. United States5 3 the Court of Claims acknowledged the equitable obligations of the United States to insure the payment
of laborers and materialmen and reciprocally, the equitable right of laborers
and materialmen to assert their claim to monies held by the government
which are due the contractor.5 4 Subsequently, in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. United States"5 the Court of Claims held that unpaid subcon-

tractors who had received the total amount of the payment bond had no
standing to enforce an equitable lien on amounts that were retained or should
56
have been retained by the United States.
A government subcontractor's remedies are not delineated, however,
when the payment bond has not been filed. Such an absence of remedy
coupled with the bankruptcy of the prime contractor was the factual basis
on which the court granted an equitable lien to the unpaid subcontractor in
48. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
49. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269, 273 (1946); Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404, 405 (1908); Prairie State Bank
v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 233 (1896); Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 376
F.2d 890, 893 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
50. United States ex rel. Reuter v. MacDonald Constr. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1363, 1366
(E.D. Mo. 1968); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 384 (Ct. CI.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955). But see United Pacific Ins. Co. v. United States,
319 F.2d 893, 896, n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1963). See also J.V. Gleason Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 452 F.2d 1219, 1225 (8th Cir. 1971); Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 169
F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
51. 295 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
52. Id. at 1366.
53. 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. C.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
54. Id. at 384.
55. 475 F.2d 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
56. id. at 1382,
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Kennedy Electric Co. v. United States Postal Service.5 7 The Postal Service

cited United States v. Munsey Trust Co.58 as dispositive of Kennedy's claims

because in Munsey the Court had stated that "laborers and materialmen do
not have enforceable rights against the United States for their compensation." 59 The court in Kennedy found this argument inapplicable, however,
emphasizing that the statement in Munsey was based on the premise that
laborers and materialmen were protected by the statutorily required payment
bond. 60 Such a premise is absent in Kennedy because there was no Miller
Act surety to provide this security. The court in Kennedy also subordinated the Postal Service's claim for liquidated damages to Kennedy's claims
because of equitable considerations, 6 ' thus reducing the status of the
Postal Service to that of a stakeholder. The rule announced in Munsey is
clearly inapplicable in a situation such as Kennedy because in Munsey the
Court expressly excluded such a factual situation from the scope of its deci-

sion: "We need not decide whether laborers and materialmen would have
any claim to the retained percentages if both contractor and surety failed to
'6 2
pay them."
Fifteen years later the Supreme Court in Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance

Co. 6 3 finally settled a conflict among the circuit courts over the interpretation
57. 508 F.2d 954, 960 (10th Cir. 1974).

The Tenth Circuit has previously held

that a lien becomes effective when the right to a fund materializes or when the fund
comes into existence. Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485, 490 (10th Cir. 1965). An
equitable lien is a right, not recognized by law, to have a fund or specific property applied in whole or in part to the payment of a particular debt or obligation, but it is not
a property right in the thing itself nor a right to obtain possession of the fund or property. Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, 143 F.2d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 1944).
58. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
59. Id. at 241.
60. Id. at 243-44.
61. The court in Kennedy determined that Kennedy's equitable rights outweighed
those of the Postal Service in several aspects. The Department, the Postal Service's
predecessor, precipitated this controversy by awarding a contract to Corrigan, before
Corrigan filed the payment and performance bond, in violation of the Miller Act. The
Department subsequently failed to exercise the supervision prescribed by the Department
Regulations and made illegal progress payments to Corrigan's assignee, First National
Bank of Boston. The Postal Service had received the benefit of Kennedy's labor and
material which had been incorporated into the mail facility. It has an obligation to pay
and Kennedy has the right to be paid for the labor and material. The retainage from
which Kennedy seeks recovery was originally created to pay for the construction of the
mail facility, thus although the Postal Service is not affirmatively recovering its liquidated damages it is not being forced to pay Kennedy out of monies not appropriated
for this project. The Postal Service would have been unjustly enriched for its negligence
and illegal conduct if the court had not granted an equitable lien in favor of Kennedy.
For cases supporting subordination of claims because of equitable considerations see,
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton,
247 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1957); Wheeling Valley Coal Corp. v. Meade, 171 F.2d
916, 919 (4th Cir. 1949); Hanssen v. Wingren, 121 F.2d 1011, 1013 (10th Cir. 1941).
62. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 242 (1947).
63. 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
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and effect of Munsey. 64 Munsey, it was held, "left the-rule in PrairieBank
and Henningsen undisturbed." 6 The Pearlman decision further strengthened Kennedy's argument that an unpaid subcontractor had an equitalble lien
on the retainage in stating that "the Government had a right to use the retained fund to pay laborers and materialmen; that the laborers and materialmen had a right to be paid out of the fund .
"...
66 The government's
relationship toward laborers and materialmen had thus developed from an
equitable obligation in Henningsen, into a right of both the government and
laborers and materialmen to satisfy the suppliers' unpaid claims out of the
retainage. The Postal Service nevertheless urges that the decision in United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States6 7 is the correct analysis and
application of the Munsey and Pearlmandecisions.6 8 Guaranty Co. is distinguishable from Kennedy in two important factual aspects. First, the defendant in the instant case is the United States Postal Service, with the statutory
power to sue and be sued.69 In Guaranty Co. the defendant was the United
States government-protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Second, in Guaranty Co. the surety had fulfilled his obligation by paying to
the extent of his bond, while in Kennedy, because of the Department's failure
to exact the payment bond, there was no surety from whom the subcontractors could recover.
Several courts have recognized a distinction between the position of the
Guaranty Co. subcontractor, who is protected by a bond, and the Kennedy
subcontractor who is not. 70 The court in United Pacific Insurance Co. v.
United States71 declared the Miller Act to be the sole remedy of an unpaid
subcontractor, noting that "there is no question in this case of the solvency
of the surety."'72 Such a qualifying statment suggests that there is another
remedy when, as in Kennedy, the surety is insolvent or nonexistent. 73 So
64. Some Circuit Courts of Appeals held that the surety was not entitled to subrogation. See American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1958); Phoenix
Indem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1955). The conflict was resolved in
In re Dutcher Constr. Corp., 298 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir.), a! 'd sub nom., Pearlman
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 141 (1962), where the Supreme Court concluded
that the surety was entitled to the fund by subrogation.
65. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 141 (1962).
66. Id. at 141.
67. 475 F.2d 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1973).

68. Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 954, 959 (10th Cir.
1974).
69. 39 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970).
70. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 893, 896, n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1963);
United States ex rel. Brown Bros. Grading Co. v. F. D. Rich Co., 285 F. Supp. 572, 577
(D.S.C. 1968); United States ex rel. Reuter v. MacDonald Constr. Co., 295 F. Supp.
1363, 1366 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
71. 319 F.2d 893 (Ct. Cl. 1963).

72. Id.at 896 n.1.
73. United States ex rel. Brown Bros. Grading Co. v. F.D. Rich Co., 285 F. Supp.
572, 577 (D.S.C. 1968).
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too, in United States ex rel. Reuter v. MacDonald Construction Co., 74 the
court said that the materialmen or laborers could not pursue the remedy of
an equitable lien on the retainage unless the Miller Act surety was insolvent
and therefore unable to pay the amounts to which they were entitled. 75 In
order for Kennedy to fully satisfy its claim to this remedy it must recover
not only from the funds retained but also from the funds which should have
been withheld. 76 The courts have consistently held that the government
cannot escape liability to a Miller Act surety by making a wrongful payment. 77 The trial court in Kennedy cited National Surety Corp. v. United
States 7 reiterating the right of materialmen to assert a claim against funds
in the hands of the United States or funds which, under its regulations, should
be in its hands. 79 This had the effect of increasing an unpaid subcontractor's
sources of recovery while further patterning a subcontractor's rights after
those of a surety.
In Kennedy the court has interpreted the Miller Act not as the exclusive
remedy of an unpaid subcontractor but as an additional protection. Although
the Miller Act affords the ordinary and primary protection for laborers,
materialmen, and subcontractors, the retainage becomes available when such
statutory security proves insufficient.8 0 The decision poses the question
whether the extension of the surety's equities to an unpaid, unbonded subcontractor reach further than to the subcontractor. Since suppliers of subcontractors, as well as the subcontractors themselves, can recover on a Miller
Act bond, 8 ' these suppliers should logically be able to assert an equitable lien
on the retainage as well. Implicit in this argument is the problem of
determining priority to the fund between an unpaid subcontractor and the
unpaid supplier when the prime contractor is bankrupt and there is no surety.
74. 295 F. Supp. 1363, (E.D. Mo. 1963).
75. Id. at 1366.
76. At the time of trial, the Postal Service held a fund of only $35,739.47; therefore, the court extended Kennedy's equitable lien to the March 24, 1971 progress payment of $190,747.00 in order to fully satisfy Kennedy's claim of $61,281.31 plus interest.
Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 954, 960 (10th Cir. 1974).
77. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 421 F.2d 706, 709 (Ct. Cl. 1970);
Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 890, 892 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Hanover Ins.
Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
78. 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
79. Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 828, 843 (D.
Colo. 1973) (emphasis added).
80. See Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 F. 144, 148
(6th Cir. 1921).
81. Illinois Sur. Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917); Mankin v.
United States, 215 U.S. 533, 539-40 (1910); United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur.
Co., 200 U.S. 197, 205 (1906). In Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S.
102, 105 (1944) the Supreme Court held that the phrase in the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.
§ 270(a) (1970), that " 'all persons supplying [the contractor] . . . with labor and materials' included not only those furnishing labor and materials directly to the prime contractor but also covered those who contributed labor and materials to subcontractors."
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Faced with this situation again, the courts should probably recognize an equitable lien for both classes of claimants and make a pro rata distribution of the
82
fund.
Several options exist by which to avoid the recurrence of this situation.
The Miller Act could be amended to create a statutory cause of action and
remedy for the unpaid subcontractor when there has been a failure to exact
the required bond.8 3 Congress could also increase the burden on the subcontractor by requiring him to be certain that the bonds have been filed before
he furnishes any labor or material to the contractor. A third choice is to
facilitate the method by which the successful claimant may execute on his
judgment. Presently, a party must present his judgment to the General
Accounting Office to be paid from a general appropriation provided by Congress in order to settle judgments against the United States.8 4
The position of a federal government subcontractor is a precarious one.
He does not have the statutory mechanic's liens available in the private construction industry; nor does he have the same bargaining power dealing with
the federal government as he might have with a private individual or
business. The Miller Act provides adequate protection for subcontractors so
long as it is viewed as an additional protection and not an exclusive remedy.
If the Miller Act were deemed the sole remedy, a subcontractor's freedom
to contract would be further limited because he would be forced to assume
the risk of not being paid while being virtually powerless to shift the burden
to the prime contractor and the federal government-the principal parties to
the main contract. Such a mandatory assumption of risk might persuade
the subcontractor not to engage in federal government contracts thus producing more difficulties in the construction industry.
Martha 1. Macartney
82. By extending an equitable lien to both the unpaid subcontractor and the unpaid

supplier of the subcontractor the courts would create a remedy for the claimants when

there is no surety that parallels their remedy when the Miller Act surety exists. As in
past decisions where the source of recovery has been insufficient to satisfy all the claims,
the courts would distribute the monies proportionate to the different interests of the parties.
83. In a minority of state decisions the public body has been held liable for failure
to exact the bonds required by the state statute. Such liability has been based on the
fact that the particular statute involved included a specific cause of action and remedy
for unpaid laborers and materialmen in this type of situation. Stephenson v. Monmouth Min. Mfg. Co., 84 F. 114, 117 (6th Cir. 1897); Warren ex rel. Hughes Supply
Co. v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 66 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1953); C.A. Burton Mach. Co.
v. Ruth, 186 S.W. 737, 737-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916). If the Miller Act were amended
to include such a change, holding the government liable for such non-compliance would
be easier.
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 2517-2519 (1970); 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1970). Under
these provisions, claimants are subject to delays in payment which could injure them financially and which could partially be avoided by the creation of a more direct method
of execution.
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